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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a Summary Judgment entered in the Fifth Judicial 
District Court by the Honorable G. Rand Beacham finding that Plaintiffs 
complaint was filed after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to an 
Order of the Utah Supreme Court issued pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4). 
3 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
There are two separate issues in this case: 
1) Does an Unsigned Minute Entry dispose of a case? 
2) Do the tolling provisions of the Utah Medical Malpractice Act, 
Utah Code Section 78-14-12(3)(a), apply to the one-year statute 
of limitations provided by Utah Code Section 78-12-40 - the 
Savings Statute? 
5 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
There are no facts in dispute; this issue involves a question of law and 
should be reviewed under the "Legal Correctness" standard.1 
1
 Norman v. Arnold, 2002 UT 81,115, 57 P.3d 997 
Stokes v. Wagoneer, 1999 UT 94,1J6, 987 P.2d 602 
6 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Section 78-14-12(3)(a): 
The filing of a request for prelitigation panel review under this 
section tolls the applicable statute of limitations until the earlier of 
60 days following the division's issuance of an opinion by the 
prelitigation panel, or 60 days following the termination of 
jurisdiction by the division as provided in this subsection. The 
division shall send any opinion issued by the panel to all parties 
by regular mail. 
Utah Code Section 78-12-40: 
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment 
thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such 
action or upon a cause of action otherwise than upon the merits, 
and the time limited either by law or contract for commencing the 
same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause 
of action survives, his representatives, may commence a new 
action within one year after the reversal or failure. 
7 
Applicable provisions of Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration2 
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or parties obtaining 
a ruling shall within fifteen days, or within a shorter time as the 
court may direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment, 
or decree in conformity with the ruling. 
(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be reduced to 
writing and presented to the court for signature within fifteen days 
of the settlement and dismissal. 
(7) No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon stipulation shall be 
signed and entered unless the stipulation is in writing, signed by 
the attorneys of record for the respective parties and filed with the 
clerk of the stipulation was made on the record. 
2
 Applicable at the time of this case. 
8 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A Complaint was filed in the Fifth District Court by Michael Sutter 
alleging medical malpractice against Dr. Stan Benson and the Dixie Regional 
Medical Center. Service was made on the Dixie Regional Medical Center; 
service had not, yet, been made on Dr. Stan Benson. 
Counsel for the Dixie Regional Medical Center filed a Motion to Dismiss 
based upon Plaintiffs failure to have a Prelitigation Hearing pursuant to the 
provisions of Utah Code Section 78-14-12. In lieu of argument, the parties 
stipulated to have the case dismissed without prejudice - which would allow 
Plaintiff the opportunity to have a Prelitigation Hearing and, then, re-file the 
case pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Section 78-12-40 (providing a 
one-year statute of limitations to re-file a case not decided upon the merits). 
A Prelitigation Hearing was, subsequently, conducted; and a Certificate 
of Compliance was issued. 
Plaintiff, then, filed a new Complaint against Dr. Stan Benson and the 
Dixie Regional Medical Center. Service was made on both Defendants. 
Dixie Regional Medical Center was dismissed. 
Defendant Stan Benson filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting 
that the second Complaint was filed beyond the expiration of the one-year 
statute of limitations provided by Utah Code Section 78-12-40. 
9 
The Court granted Defendant Stan Benson's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
10 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1) Mr. Michael Sutter timely filed a Notice of Intent to Commence Legal 
Action against Dr. Stan Benson and the Dixie Regional Medical Center. 
2) Mr. Sutter, subsequently, filed a Complaint alleging medical malpractice 
against Dr. Stan Benson and the Dixie Regional Medical Center. 
3) Service was made upon the Dixie Regional Medical Center; Dr. Benson 
had not, yet, been served. 
4) Although Mr. Benson timely filed a Notice of Intent to Commence Legal 
Action upon Dr. Benson and the Dixie Regional Medical Center pursuant 
to Utah Code Section 78-14-8, Mr. Benson failed to timely file a Request 
for a Prelitigation Hearing as required by Utah Code Section 78-14-12. 
5) Counsel for the Dixie Regional Medical Center filed a Motion to Dismiss 
based upon Mr. Benson's failure to request a prelitigation hearing. 
6) A Hearing on the Motion to Dismiss was set for April 20, 2000. 
7) Recognizing the case could not proceed without a Prelitigation Hearing, 
counsel for Plaintiff and counsel for the Dixie Regional Medical Center 
agreed to submit a Stipulation to dismiss the case without prejudice so 
that Plaintiff could request and have a Prelitigation Hearing and, then, re-
11 
file the case within one year after its dismissal pursuant to the provisions 
of Utah Code Section 78-12-40.3 
8) A Stipulation of Dismissal was submitted to the Court on April 19, 2000 
- the day before the scheduled Hearing - so that the Court would find the 
Stipulation in the file at the time of the Hearing.4 
9) None of the parties was present at the Hearing on April 20, 2000 - the 
parties having submitted the Stipulation to the Court in lieu of being 
present (counsel for the Dixie Regional Medical Center being from out-
of-town did not want to have to travel to appear in St. George). 
10) The Minutes of the Hearing on April 20, 2000, stated: "HEARING -
There being no one present and a Stipulation to Dismiss (Without 
Prejudice) [sic] being filed. Court orders this matter dismissed."5 
11) On May 9, 2000, Plaintiff mailed a second Notice of Intent to Commence 
Legal Action to Dr. Benson and the Dixie Regional Medical Center in 
order to re-start the process to request a Prelitigation Hearing. 
12) On May 11, 2000, Mr. Sutter filed a Request for a Prelitigation Hearing. 
13) A Prelitigation Hearing was held on September 21, 2000. 
14) On November 15, 2000, the Panel Opinion was signed. 
3
 The "Savings Statute" 
4
 Order Granting Stan Benson, M.D.'s Motion for Summary Judgment ^9 
5
 Order Granting Stan Benson, M.D.'s Motion for Summary Judgment [^10 
12 
15) On November 16, 2000, the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing issued the Prelitigation Panel Opinion and a Certificate of 
Compliance. 
16) Prior to filing a new Complaint, and recognizing that Plaintiff had one 
year, pursuant to Utah Code Section 78-12-40, to re-file a Complaint 
from the date the initial case had been dismissed, Plaintiffs counsel 
contacted the Court Clerk via telephone to ascertain the date the initial 
case had been dismissed in order to calculate the expiration date of the 
one-year statute of limitations provided by Utah Code Section 78-12-40. 
17) Plaintiffs counsel knew that a Hearing had been held on April 20, 2000, 
(at which time Defendant's Motion to dismiss had, likely, been granted 
based upon the parties' Stipulation); however, Plaintiffs counsel did not 
know when the opposing counsel had submitted a formal Final Order for 
the Court's signature nor when that Order had been signed and entered. 
18) Plaintiffs counsel was informed by the Court Clerk over the telephone 
that the case had been dismissed on April 24, 2000. 
19) Accordingly, Plaintiff re-filed a new Complaint on April 23, 2001. 
20) After being served, Defendant Stan Benson, subsequently, filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment asserting that the claim was time-barred for 
failure to file within the one-year statute of limitations provided by Utah 
13 
Code Section 78-12-40 asserting that the initial case had, actually, been 
dismissed on April 20, 2000 - the date of the Hearing on the initial case. 
21) Upon a review of the Court's case file, it was discovered that an unsigned 
Minute Entry had been entered on the date of the Hearing indicating that 
the Court had ordered that the case be dismissed; however, there were no 
subsequent filings (Orders, etc.) in the Court's file - no formal Order had 
been submitted to the Court, and no signed Order existed in the file! 
22) Unable to locate any documentation in the Court's file indicating that the 
case had been dismissed on April 24, 2000 - as Plaintiffs counsel had 
been informed by the Court Clerk over the telephone, Plaintiffs counsel 
searched the Court's computer's data file for any additional information; 
therein, Plaintiffs counsel discovered a computer-generated document 
entitled "CASE HISTORY" which stated: "CASE DEPOSITION -
4/24/2000 Dismsd [sic] w/o prejudice by Judge G. RAND BEACHAM".6 
23) A Hearing was, subsequently, held on Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment asserting that the new Complaint had not been timely filed. 
24) At the Hearing, discussion was heard regarding the lack of a formal 
Order. Furthermore, the Court entertained Plaintiffs observation that, 
even if the initial case had been dismissed on April 20, 2000 (the date of 
6
 A Copy is attached. 
14 
the Hearing on the initial case), the one-year statute of limitations in 
which to re-file the case had been tolled pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Section 78-14-12 - which provides that the applicable statute 
of limitations is tolled during the Prelitigation Hearing process; therefore, 
7 
the applicable one-year statute of limitations had not expired. 
25) The Court concluded that, although no formal Order had been signed, the 
initial case had been dismissed on April 20, 2000 (the date of the Hearing 
on the initial case at which no parties were present) and that, accordingly, 
Plaintiffs new Complaint had not been timely filed. 
26) Defendant (the prevailing party) prepared and submitted a proposed 
Order granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
27) Plaintiff s counsel submitted an objection to said Order indicating that 
Defendant's proposed Order failed to address the Court's decision on the 
application of the tolling provisions to the one-year statute of limitations. 
28) The Court signed an Order prepared by Defendant's counsel. The Court, 
also, prepared and entered a Memorandum Decision addressing 
Although the issue had not been briefed by the parties before the Hearing, 
Plaintiffs counsel had informed Defendant's counsel of the issue before the 
date of the Hearing and both parties were prepared and did make arguments 
during the Hearing regarding the effect of the tolling provisions on the case. 
15 
Plaintiffs argument that the applicable one-year statute of limitations had 
been tolled during the Prelitigation Hearing process. 
16 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A case is not disposed of unless and until an Order is signed and entered. 
Many past Utah appellate cases clearly indicate that an unsigned minute 
entry does is not a final judgment and does not dispose of a case. 
In this case, because there is only an unsigned minute entry granting 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and there is no signed order, there has been no 
final judgment entered and the case, technically, is still open. 
Accordingly, the one-year statute of limitations provided by Utah Code 
Section 78-12-40 has not, yet, begun to run! 
Thus, Plaintiff has timely filed the second complaint. 
Even if the case has been closed as the result of an unsigned minute 
entry, the one-year statute of limitations in which to re-file a complaint was 
tolled during the Prelitigation Hearing process and Plaintiffs second complaint 
was timely filed. 
17 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
FIRST ISSUE 
IS AN UNSIGNED MINUTE ENTRY A FINAL JUDGMENT 
One issue in this case is whether the initial case has ever been formally 
disposed of because there has never been a signed Order entered by the Court. 
This issue has been addressed by this Court on numerous occasions in the 
past. The important purpose of requiring a formal signed Order is to provide a 
definitive time for the final disposition of a case. 
Plaintiff argues that there needs to be a formal SIGNED Order to dispose 
of a case. 
The Defendant and the trial court, apparently, suggest that the Court's 
oral granting of the Motion to Dismiss during a Hearing is sufficient to dispose 
of a case and that no formal Order need be signed and/or entered by the court. 
There must be some order in the administration of justice - can there be 
one date that a case is disposed of if no formal Order is signed and entered and 
a different date if a formal Order is later signed and entered by a Court? 
For example, in this case, if Defendant's counsel had, subsequent to the 
Hearing, submitted an Order to the Court for the Court's signature (as required 
by Rule 4-504 of the, then applicable, Rules of Judicial Administration) this 
case would have been disposed of on date that Order was signed and entered by 
18 
the Court; yet, because no formal written Order was submitted to the Court for 
the Court's signature, the date the case is deemed disposed of is the date the 
Court stated it granted Defendant's motion during a Hearing. 
Such an administration of justice would create chaos! 
o 
As stated in the case of Lukich v. Utah Const. Co. : 
If there is a judgment, there is a right way to show it. 
In Ron Shepherd Insurance, Inc. v. Shields,9 the Court noted: 
[A]n unsigned minute entry was made which reads in pertinent 
part: 
This case is before the court for hearing on defendant's motion 
for summary judgment, . . . The motion is argued to the court 
by counsel and submitted. The court being fully advised grants 
the motion . . .10 
The Court, further, noted that: 
At no time did Judge Lewis sign an order granting defendant's 
motion for summary judgment or a judgment entering summary 
judgment in favor of defendants. 
The Court, addressing the issue, stated: 
8
 Lukich v. Utah Const. Co., 150 P. 298 (Utah 1915) 
9
 Ron Shepherd Insurance Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650 (Utah 1994) 
10
 Ron Shepherd Insurance at 652 
19 
That ruling appeared only as an unsigned minute entry. It is well 
settled that '[a]n unsigned minute entry does not constitute an 
entry of judgment, nor is it a final judgment for purposes of 
[appeal] {sic}.' [citations omitted] {sic} Because Judge Lewis 
never signed an order granting defendants' motion for summary 
judgment nor entered judgment thereon, there is not a final order 
or judgment by Judge Lewis to be considered. 
In Swenson Associates Architects, P.C. v. State . . „ n where a party 
argued that a signed minute entry constituted the 'first signed order' and that the 
final order was "simply superfluous," the Court stated: 
This court has recognized that in appropriate circumstances, a 
signed minute entry may be [sic] a final order for purposes of 
appeal, [citations omitted] However, such treatment is appropriate 
only where "the ruling specifies with certainty a final 
determination of the rights of the parties and is susceptible of 
enforcement." [citations omitted] It must be clear that that "which is 
offered as the record of a judgment is really such and not an order 
for a judgment or a mere memorandum from which the judgment 
11
 Swenson Associates Architects, P.C. v. State By and Through Div. Of 
Facilities Const., 889 P.2d 415 (Utah 1994) 
20 
was to be drawn." Hartford Accident & Indent. Co. v. Clegg, 103 
Utah 414, 420, 135 P.2d 919, 922 (1943) (quoting 33 C.J. 
Judgments § 118 (1924)).12 
The Court went on to note: 
In Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., this court held that a 
minute entry signed by the trial court stating that "[t]he within 
entitled matter having been by the court taken under advisement, 
the court now renders its decision that judgment be entered 
against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendant," id. at 419, 135 
1 ^ 
P.2d at 921, was not itself a final order. 
In the case of State v. Gerrard,14 the Supreme Court stated: 
While we have not found a Utah criminal case dealing with this 
specific issue, the law is well settled in the state that the 
statements made by a trial judge are not the judgment of the case 
and it is only the signed judgment that prevails.15 
In Watson v. Odell,16 the Supreme Court made an important observation: 
[0]n the 28th day of August [1917], . . . [the trial court] granted 
Swenson at 417 {emphasis added} 
i ^ Swenson at 417 {emphasis added} 
14
 State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885 (Utah 1978) 
15
 Gerrard at 887 
16
 Watson v. Odell 176 P. 619 (Utah 1918) 
21 
the motion for nonsuit in an oral opinion in which the court gives 
its reasons at length why the motion should be granted, which 
opinion ends as follows: 
"For these reasons the motion for nonsuit is granted, and an order 
may be entered dismissing the case." 
It further appears that the plaintiffs counsel, desiring to appeal 
from the judgment dismissing the action, and discovering that no 
formal judgment of dismissal had been entered, on the 2d day of 
March, 1918, requested the clerk of said court to enter a formal 
judgment of dismissal; that the clerk, pursuant to said request, on 
said day caused a blank form of judgment of dismissal to be filled 
out and filed in his office; that said judgment was not entered in 
any book or record until the 20th day of March following; that 
counsel for plaintiff, assuming that the judgment had been 
formally entered on said 2d day of March, duly served and filed a 
notice of appeal in due form on said day. 
Upon the record the defendants now contend that, if it be held that 
the ruling of the district court granting the motion for nonsuit and 
ordering the action dismissed is an appealable judgment, then the 
notice of appeal which was served and filed as aforesaid was not 
22 
served and filed within the time required by our statute, namely, 
within six months from the entry of judgment, and hence this 
court has no jurisdiction of the appeal. Upon the other hand, they 
contend that if it be held that the order of August 29, 1917, is not 
an appealable judgment, then this appeal is premature, since the 
judgment filed by the clerk on March 2, 1918, was not entered 
until March 20, 1918. 
This court has held that an order similar to the one made by the 
district court on August 29, 1917, is not a final and appealable 
judgment. Lukich v. Utah Construction Co., 46 Utah, 317, 150 
Pac. 298. In the same case reported in 48 Utah, 452, 160 Pac. 270, 
it was further held that the time for an appeal begins to run from 
the actual entry of the judgment of dismissal. Those cases have 
repeatedly been followed by this court in rulings from the bench, 
and numerous appeals have been dismissed because no formal 
judgment of dismissal had been entered. The rule laid down in 
those cases has thus become the settled practice of this court-
Counsel for neither side question the soundness of those cases, 
and we can see no reason why the rule should not be adhered to. It 
is the only safe course to pursue. No one should be left in doubt 
23 
respecting the record of a judgment nor where it is entered or can 
1 1 
be found. 
In the case of State v. Jiminez,18 the Court noted: 
We must dismiss defendant's appeal because his notice of appeal 
was prematurely filed. . . . In Swenson Associates Architects v. 
State, 889 P.2d 415, 416 (Utah 1994), the plaintiff filed a timely 
post-trial motion, which was denied in a signed minute entry. The 
plaintiff filed his appeal within thirty days of this minute entry but 
four days before the court issued its written order denying the new 
trial motion. We ruled that this court lacked jurisdiction because 
the plaintiff had filed his notice of appeal before the trial court 
entered its order.19 Defendant seeks to distinguish this case from 
Swenson on the ground that the unsigned minute entry entered by 
the trial court in the instant case did not direct either counsel to 
prepare a formal written order denying the motion, as was the case 
in Swenson. That distinction is unavailing since the minute entry 
in this case was unsigned, and we have consistently dismissed 
Watson at 619 {emphasis added} 
18
 State v. Jiminez, 938 P.2d 264 (Utah 1997) 
19
 The Court, here, is referring to the formal written Order - even though there 
was a signed minute entry. 
24 
appeals from unsigned minute entries. See, e.g., South Salt Lake v. 
Burton, 718 P.2d 405 (Utah 1986) (citing numerous cases holding 
same) [sic].20 
In Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n v. Watts,21 the Court noted: 
Since the prepared order was never signed by the court and the 
ruling only appears as an unsigned minute entry, we have no 
jurisdiction to rule on this issue. 
99 
In Ahlstrom v. Anderson, the Court noted: 
That same day, an unsigned minute entry was entered by the clerk 
indicating that the motion had been denied. No final order was 
thereafter signed or entered in the record. An unsigned minute 
entry is not a final appeallable order, [citations omitted] 
9^ 
In Sather v. Gross, the Court recognized that an unsigned minute entry 
does not constitute a final judgment: 
The trial court granted the motion by an unsigned minute entry . . . 
No order appears in the record and apparently none was entered. 
An appeal can be taken only from the entry of a final judgment 
Jiminez at 265 {emphasis added} 
Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n v. Watts, 737 P.2d 154, 162 (Utah 1987) 
Ahlstrom v. Anderson, 728 P.2d 979 (Utah 1986) 






that concludes the action, [citations omitted] An unsigned minute 
entry does not constitute a final judgment for purposes of appeal 
and this Court has no jurisdiction to consider the merits of 
plaintiffs appeal. 
In South Salt Lake v. Burton,24 the Court noted: 
After trial, the court clerk recorded in a minute entry: 'The court 
thereupon finds in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant 
and order the previously imposed sentence reinstated." . . . [T]he 
minute entry was not signed by the judge. An unsigned minute 
entry is not susceptible of enforcement and does not constitute a 
final judgment for purposes of appeal to this Court. 
In Utah State Tax Com'n v. Erikson, the Court stated: 
We have consistently held that a minute entry, unsigned by the 
court and not susceptible of enforcement, does not constitute a 
final, appealable order. 
In Wisden v. City of Salina,26 the Court noted that an unsigned minute 
entry does not constitute a final judgment: 
In an unsigned minute entry . . . the district court granted 
24
 South Salt Lake v. Burton, 718 P.2d 405, 406 (Utah 1986) 
25
 Utah State Tax Com'n v. Erikson, 714 p.2d 1151, 1152 (Utah 1986) 
26
 Wisden v. City of Salina, 696 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1985) 
26 
summary judgment in favor of the City of Salina. No judgment or 
order signed by the judge as required by Utah R.Civ.P. 58A(b) 
and (c) appears in the record. An unsigned minute entry does not 
constitute a final judgment, [citations omitted] 
In Wilson v. Manning,27 the Court noted: 
An unsigned minute entry does not constitute an entry of 
judgment, nor is it a final judgment for purposes of Utah R.Civ.P. 
72(a) [regarding appeals]. 
There are many more cases which have similarly ruled on the issue. 
Wilson v. Manning, 645 P.2d 655 (Utah 1982) 
27 
SECOND ISSUE 
TOLLING OF THE APPLICABLE STATUE OF LIMITATIONS 
Even if the case the was concluded on the date an unsigned minute entry 
was entered (April 20, 2000), the applicable one-year statute of limitations 
provided by Utah Code Section 78-12-40 was tolled during the Prelitigation 
Hearing process and Plaintiffs new complaint was, accordingly, timely filed. 
Utah Code Section 78-14-12(3)(a) provides: 
The filing of a request for prelitigation panel review under this 
section tolls the applicable statute of limitations until the earlier of 
60 days following the division's issuance of an opinion by the 
prelitigation panel, or 60 days following the termination of 
jurisdiction by the division as provided in this subsection. The 
division shall send any opinion issued by the panel to all parties 
by regular mail. 
The applicable statute of limitations in this situation was the one-year 
statute of limitations provided by Utah Code Section 78-12-40 - which reads: 
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment 
thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such 
action or upon a cause of action otherwise than upon the merits, 
and the time limited either by law or contract for commencing the 
28 
same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause 
of action survives, his representatives, may commence a new 
action within one year after the reversal or failure. 
Thus, when Plaintiff filed a request for a Prelitigation Hearing, the statute 
of limitations was tolled "until the earlier of 60 days following the division's 
issuance of an opinion by the prelitigation panel, or 60 days following the 
termination of jurisdiction by the division as provided in this subsection." 
Plaintiff filed a request for a Prelitigation Hearing on May 11, 2000, the 
Division issued the panel opinion on November 16, 2000; according to the 
provisions of Utah Code Section 78-14-12(3)(a), the applicable statute of 
limitations was tolled (which, in this circumstance, was the one-year statute of 
limitations provided by Utah Code Section 78-12-40). Therefore the one-year 
statute of limitations was tolled from May 11, 2000 until sixty days after the 
Division issued the panel opinion. The Division issued the panel opinion on 
November 16, 2000; thus, the statute of limitations was tolled until January 15, 
2001 - sixty days after the Division issued the panel opinion. 
At the time the request for the Prelitigation Hearing was filed (May 11, 
2000) and the statute of limitations was tolled, three hundred forty-four days 
remained on the one-year statute of limitations, when the statute of limitations 
Utah Code Section 78-14-12(3)(a) 
29 
began running again on January 15, 2001, three hundred forty-four days 
remained from that time in which Plaintiff could re-file a complaint. Thus, 
Plaintiff could re-file a complaint through December 25, 2001. Since Plaintiff 
filed a new complaint on April 23, 2001, Plaintiff was well within the 
applicable statute of limitations to file a new complaint. 
30 
CONCLUSION 
Case law clearly requires that a formal Order be signed and entered to 
dispose of a case. Since no such Order has ever been signed, technically, the 
initial case filed by the Plaintiff has never been closed. 
Plaintiffs second complaint is, thus, timely filed. 
Furthermore, the applicable statute of limitations was tolled during the 
Prehtigation Hearing process; therefore, the new complaint was timely filed. 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL SUTTER, 
ORDER GRANTING STAN BENSON, 
Plaintiff, M.D.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
vs. 
STAN BENSON, M.D., and IHC 
HOSPITALS, INC. dba DIXIE REGIONAL 
MEDICAL CENTER, Civil No. 010500832 
Defendants. Judge G. Rand Beacham 
This matter came before the Court for ruling on May 22, 2003, pursuant to applicable a 
Notice to Submit and Request for Ruling. Before the Court for review was Stan Benson, M.D.'s 
("Dr. Benson") Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court, having reviewed the file and all of 
the memoranda filed both in support of and in opposition to the pending motion and also having 
reviewed other evidence attached as exhibits to the memoranda, having heard oral argument and 
otherwise being fully informed, finds as follows: 
The Court, after reviewing all of the memoranda, exhibits and evidence in the file and 
provided by the parties and after hearing argument on this Motion finds that the following are 
undisputed facts: 
1. On or about May 26, 1997, plaintiff presented to the emergency department at Dixie 
Regional Medical Center for treatment of a large swollen mass in his right arm. 
2. Attempting to drain the apparent abscess, Dr. Benson made a small incision on its 
surface. The incision revealed a ruptured brachial artery. Consequently, later on May 26, 1997, 
plaintiff underwent surgery to repair the artery. 
3. Plaintiff claims that as a result of Dr. Benson's incision and subsequent surgery on 
May 26, 1997., he suffered personal injury, incurred medical expenses, lost wages and other benefits 
of employment, suffered pain and anguish of mind and body, and sustained permanent 
disfigurement. 
4. On May 26, 1999, the last day in which to initiate an action against defendants prior 
to the running of the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions and pursuant to 
the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act ("Malpractice Act"), Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-8, 
plaintiff mailed a notice of intent to commence action to Dr. Benson. 
5. Because plaintiffs notice of intent was served less than ninety days prior to the 
expiration of the statute of limitations, plaintiffs time for commencing his malpractice action was 
extended 120 days from the date of service of the notice of intent. See Utah Code Annotated § 78-
14-8. As a result, plaintiffs statute of limitations in which to commence his malpractice action was 
extended to September 23, 1999. 
6. Thereafter, however, plaintiff failed to file a request for prelitigation hearing with 
DOPL, as required by the Malpractice Act, Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-12. 
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7. On September 22, 1999, apparently believing that he had complied with the 
prelitigation requirements of the Malpractice Act, plaintiff filed a complaint naming Dr. Benson. 
Dixie Regional Medical Center was served with a summons and the complaint, however, Dr. 
Benson was not served with a summons or complaint. 
8. Dixie Regional Medical Center moved to dismiss based upon a failure to comply 
with the prelitigation requirements of the Malpractice Act. Plaintiff thereafter apparently realized 
that he had failed to file a request for prelitigation hearing and that he did not have the required 
certificate of compliance from DOPL in order to proceed. 
9. On April 19, 2000, plaintiff filed a "Stipulation of Dismissal (without prejudice)" 
signed by plaintiffs attorney and Brinton Burbidge, counsel for Dixie Regional Medical Center. 
10. On April 20, 2000, at the hearing scheduled for Dixie Regional Medical Center's 
Motion to Dismiss, the Court ordered plaintiffs Complaint dismissed without prejudice, stating that 
"[t]here being no one present [at the hearing] and a Stipulation to Dismiss (Without Prejudice) 
being filed. Court orders this matter dismissed." 
11. On April 24, 2000, the Court's clerk apparently filed a document containing the 
phrase "Case disposition is dismsd w/o prejudice." 
12. On May 9, 2000, plaintiff mailed his second notice of intent to Dr. Benson. 
13. On May 11, 2000, plaintiff then filed a request for prelitigation panel review. 
14. On September 21, 2000, a prelitigation hearing was held. 
15. On November 15, 2000, the prelitigation panel issued its opinion. 
16. On November 16, 2000, DOPL issued a certificate of compliance to plaintiff. 
17. April 20, 2001, according to Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40, was the deadline for 
plaintiff to refile his Complaint. 
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18. On April 23, 2001, plaintiff refiled his Complaint against defendants. 
19. On June 11, 2002, IHC Hospitals, Inc., d/b/a Dixie Regional Medical Center, was 
dismissed by order of the Court. 
Plaintiff did not oppose or dispute any of the above facts set forth by Dr. Benson as 
undisputed either in his brief or at the hearing. 
Plaintiff claims that the date of dismissal of his first Complaint, Civil No. 990501775, was 
effective April 24, 2000, the date on which a clerk's computer entry of the fact of dismissal was 
apparently made. Dismissal did not occur on April 24, 2000, but occurred on April 20, 2000, 
according to the minute entry which documented the Court's order of dismissal rendered from the 
bench at the hearing on the same date at which no party or attorney appeared. The clerk's computer 
entry of the fact of dismissal may have been made on April 24, 2000, but that did not constitute the 
dismissal of Civil No. 990501775, the dismissal having already occurred on April 20, 2000. 
The Court is also unpersuaded by plaintiffs argument that Civil No. 990501775 is still not 
dismissed because no one complied with Rule 4-504, Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. The 
Court does not view Rule 4-504 as authority for the proposition that a court's orders from the bench 
are not effective for any purpose until entered in writing. The case authorities cited by plaintiff deal 
with the time of entry of judgment for the purposes of calculating the time for appeal. The Court is 
persuaded that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 established the deadline for plaintiff to refile his 
complaint, and that such deadline was not met by plaintiffs refiled complaint in this action. 
Plaintiff also asserted during the hearing that the applicable statute of limitations restricting 
the time in which plaintiff could refile his complaint following its first dismissal was Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-40 (party permitted one year from dismissal not on the merits to refile complaint). 
Plaintiff then asserted that this one-year period was tolled during the required prelitigation 
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proceedings pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3)(a) which provides, in pertinent part, as 
follows: "The filing of a request for prelitigation panel review under this section tolls the applicable 
statute of limitations until . . . 60 days following the division's issuance of an opinion " 
Plaintiff made this argument for the first time at the hearing. The Court also heard argument from 
counsel for Dr. Benson and received references to multiple cases on this issue. Based on the cases 
cited by Dr. Benson's counsel and arguments made to the Court, the Court rejects plaintiffs 
argument. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that for the above reasons and 
those contained in Stan Benson, M.D.'s memoranda filed with the Court and arguments and 
citations made to the Court at the Hearing held May 22, 2003, defendant Stan Benson, M.D.'s 
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. The parties are to bear their own attorney's fees and 
costs. 
DATED this Hj day of Attgias), 2003: 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable G. Rand Beacham 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Richard M. Hutchins 
Attorney for plaintiff 
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IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL SUTTER, ; 
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STAN BENSON, M.D. et al., ] 
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) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
) RE SECTION 78-14- 12(3)(a) 
> Civil No. 010500832 
i Judge G. Rand Beacham 
The Court's Ruling on Defendant's motion for summary judgment was entered June 
11, 2003. Defendant thereafter submitted an order for Plaintiffs review, and Plaintiff filed 
an objection to the proposed order on June 27, 2003. Defendant's counsel then submitted 
two forms of orders to the Court, but did not file a memorandum in response to Plaintiffs 
objection, and a notice to submit, until March 8, 2004. 
Between the entry of the Ruling and the date of this memorandum decision, the Court 
has taken some time to reconsider its Ruling. This reconsideration was prompted by the 
decision of the Utah Supreme Court in McBride- Williams v. Huard. 2004 UT 21 affirming 
this Court's ruling on a savings statute issue in another case, and by this Court's research in 
connection with a ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion in Pugh v. Dozzo-Otero, Civil No. 
020502154, Fifth District Court for Washington County, State of Utah. The Court has now 
concluded, however, that nothing in either of these cases affects the Court's Ruling in this 
case. 
Plaintiffs objection to Defendant's proposed order is based on an argument first made 
by Plaintiff in the hearing on Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff argued 
that the one-year period in which Plaintiff could refile his complaint following its first 
dismissal was further tolled (i.e., it stopped running) for sixty days during the prelitigation 
proceedings, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3)(a). This Court, like all others, 
generally declines to consider arguments of which a party has given no notice before a 
motion hearing, for the reason that it is fundamentally unfair to allow a party to be ambushed 
at a hearing by an argument which could, and should, have been made known in a 
memorandum. Nevertheless, when the result of a motion may be the dismissal of a party's 
claims on a basis other than the merits, some attention may be paid to an argument which 
may preserve those claims, even when that means the other party has been blind-sided. 
Fortunately, Defendant's counsel was also prepared to respond on the merits of Plaintiff s 
belated argument, with opposing legal authorities and analysis which the Court found 
persuasive. 
In addition, dictum in a decision rendered by the Utah Supreme Court after the Court's 
Ruling in this case appears to have some bearing on Plaintiffs tolling argument. In Jensen 
v. IHC Hospitals, Inc.. 2003 UT 51, K 15, n. 5, 82 P.3d 1076, the court appears to have 
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inteipreted § 78-14-12(3 )(a) to extend a statute of limitations which would otherwise expire 
during a prelitigation panel review, rather than to "toll" or stop the running of a statute of 
limitations which would not expire during a prelitigation panel review. Although the 
footnote in Jensen is dictum, it does appear to involve an interpretation which is contrary to 
Plaintiffs tolling argument. 
[n this case, the sixty-day extension under § 78-14-12(3)(a) was irrelevant, because 
Plaintiff still had more than eleven months left to file the second complaint. Consequently, 
the Court is not persuaded by Plaintiffs argument. 
Dated this L\ day of May, 2004. 
IS G. RAND BfeACHAM, JUDGE 
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